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M A J O R  F O R M S  O F  C O L L E C T I V E  A C T I O N  IN W E S T E R N  
EUROPE 1500-1975  
CHARLES TILLY 
Any effort to sort into a few categories the many different ways Europeans 
have acted together in pursuit of  common grievances or aspirations is bound 
to do injustice to the richness of  human behavior. Yet to categorize is a first 
step on the way to identifying what there is to explain, and therefore on the 
way to explaining it. If we compare the continuous forms of collective action 
which prevailed in sixteenth-century western Europe- the  exertion of  pressure 
through craft guilds, the collective appeal to a landlord, and so on-wi th  those 
of the twentieth century, we see a world of  difference. In the twentieth 
century, we discover elections, political parties, associations, pressure groups, 
trade unions and many other factions which were practically nonexistent five 
centuries ago. The contrast between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries 
appears even more dramatically when we turn to discontinuous forms of  
action such as the peasant revolt, the tax rebellion, or the mutiny. This paper 
will sketch a rough classification of discontinuous forms of collective action, 
place some of the most widespread varieties of  European collective action 
"within the classification, and discuss some of  the ways the repertoire of 
collective actions available to ordinary Europeans has changed since 1500. 
The classification stresses the nature of  the interaction between other groups 
and the group whose action we are classifying. More precisely, it depends on 
the claims the collective actors are asserting in their action: competitive 
claims, reactive claims or proactive claims. 
Competitive actions lay claim to resources also claimed by other groups 
which the actor defines as rivals, competitors, or at least as participants in the 
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same contest. Take the charivari for example. Only recently have European 
historians begun to ur.cover the larger base of competition and control on 
which this ostensibly frivolous custom rested. John Gillis describes one 
standard version: 
In a typical rural charivari, a recently remarried widower might find 
himself awakened by the clamor of the crowd, an effigy of his dead wife 
thrust up to his window and a likeness of himself, placed backward on an 
ass, drawn through the streets for his neighbors to see. Paying of a 
"contribution" to the Lord of Misrule might quiet his youthful tormen- 
tors, but by that time the voices of village conscience had made their 
point. Second marriages invariably drew the greatest wrath and, by con- 
trast, endogamous marriages of young people of roughly the same age were 
the occasion of the youth group's rejoicing. In that case, the functions of 
charivari were reversed and the couple were accompanied by a noisy crowd 
to their wedding bed, the ritual sendoff of its former members by the peer 
group. 1 
Mild enough, even if one adds the customary thumping of pans and blowing 
of horns. Yet the charivari became a "disorder" in the eyes (and, no doubt, 
the ears) of the authorities when it persisted more than a night or two, or 
when dozens of young people joined the fun. The village age-groups also 
fought the youth of neighboring villages, sometimes lethally. They also 
assembled as a bloc at public ceremonies, sometimes mounting elaborate 
charades to mock and warn those who had transgressed their rules. All these 
activities affirmed the priority of the village age-group over the eligible 
females and over the rituals of courtship within their own villages. Within 
their sphere, they were deadly serious. 
The charivari, the village fight and the youth group's mocking ceremony had 
many relatives. There were brawls between student groups, different de- 
tachments of soldiers, soldiers and civilians, ethnic and religious groups. There 
were the more highly routinized struggles of rival groups of artisans to 
dishonor each other's symbols, impede each other's ceremonies and challenge 
each other's priority in processions and other public assemblies. Somehow 
these forms of action seem trivial and quaint to twentieth-century people 
who have seen giant wars and mass murder, and who have come to think of 
"serious" politics as having a national or international scope. They were, 
indeed, usually small, short-lived, local in scope. They rarely linked with 
revolutionary movements or great rebellions. Yet they left their toll of dead 
and injured; in times of crisis they blended into major conflicts. 
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Some features of competitive collective action, such as the ritualized 
mockery, carried over into the second major category: reactive collective 
actions. They consist of group efforts to reassert established claims when 
someone else challenges or violates them. Speaking of peasant land invasions 
in contemporary Peru, E.J.  Hobsbawm points out that they take three 
forms: squatting on land to which no one (or only the government) has a 
clear title, expropriating land to which the invaders have not previously 
enjoyed a claim and to which someone else has, repossessing land from which 
the invaders have themselves been expropriated. 2 The third variant is the 
clear reactive case: the dispossessed react. That sort of land re-occupation 
characterized the first stages of Zapata's rebellion during the Mexican Re- 
volution, recurred through much of southern Italy during the massive nine- 
teenth-century concentration of land in bourgeois and noble hands, and 
marked the consolidation of bourgeois landownership wherever it developed 
in the presence of solidary peasant communities. In a standard European 
scenario, a group of villagers who had long pastured their cattle, gathered 
firewood and gleaned in common fields, found a landlord or a local official 
(or, more likely, the two in collaboration) fencing the fields by newly- 
acquired or newly-asserted right of property. The villagers commonly warned 
against the fencing. If the warning went unheeded, they attacked the fences 
and the fencers. They acted in the name of rights they still considered valid. 
The overlap with competitive forms of collective action appeared clearly 
when costumed avengers tore down the fences or occupied the fields, as in 
the Demoiselles movement of the 1830s in the Pyrenees. In other reactive 
collective actions, the overlap was at least as notable, for in both cases the 
actors commonly assumed, more or less self-consciously, the rote of the 
authorities who were being derelict in their duty, and the groups which 
reacted were often the same local solidarities: the youth groups, guilds, and 
SO o n .  
The basic outline of the land occupation applied to the bulk of European 
food riots, machine-breaking, tax rebellions and local actions against military 
conscription: all moved directly against someone who had unjustly deprived, 
or tried to deprive, a local population of a precious resource. Yves-Marie 
Berc6, expanding on his comprehensive analysis of the seventeenth-century 
rebellion of the Croquants in southwestern France, has proposed that the 
kernel of European peasant rebellions before the nineteenth century was the 
resistance of closed, solidary peasant communities to outside attempts to 
infringe upon their established rights and routines. In the case of seventeenth- 
century France, he distinguishes four major occasions for rebellion: high food 
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prices, billeting of troops, tax collection and the imposition of excise taxes by 
tax farmers. In all these cases, reports Berc6, "Revolt is the strategy of the 
little people, an extraordinary organization for defense against fiscal aggres- 
sion. ''3 As community solidarity declined, according to Berc6, the concerted 
peasant rebellion disappeared. Only much later did farmers and agricultural 
workers reappear in action. Now they were organized around forward-looking 
special-interest groups. Although (as Berc6 himself concedes) the scheme 
homogenizes unduly the participants and motives in the older forms of 
conflict, it captures an essential contrast. It is the contrast between reactive 
and proactive forms of collective action. 
Proactive collective actions assert group claims which have not previously 
been exercised. The strike for higher wages or better working conditions 
provides an everyday illustration. Deliberate work stoppages to gain a point 
have probably existed since people first worked for one another. Natalie 
Zemon Davis describes well-organized strikes in sixteenth-century Lyons. 4 
But the strike only became a common way of doing public business in the 
nineteenth century. As wage-work in organizations larger than households 
expanded, the number and scale of strikes also expanded. In most western 
countries, fifty to a hundred years went by in which strikes were increasingly 
frequent but remained illegal-sometimes prosecuted, sometimes broken up 
by armed force, sometimes tolerated, always disapproved. Under pressure 
from organized workers and their parliamentary allies, most western govern- 
ments legalized the strike between 1860 and 1900. Since then, states that 
have stepped up repression (states of emergency, wartime governments, 
Fascist regimes) have normally rescinded the right to strike, and all regimes 
have negotiated continually with workers and employers over who had the 
right to strike, and how. But in general the strike has been widely available as 
a means of action since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Government sanction of the strike shows up in strike statistics; they date 
from the 1880s or 1890s in most western countries. Their appearance reflects 
the working out of a standard public definition of the word "strike," and the 
formation of a bureaucracy to monitor and regulate the strike's use. In 
France, Michelle Perrot argues that the strike lost much of its expressive 
function, its festival air, its revolutionary potential, as the bureaucratization 
of the 1890s set in. s By way of compensation, it became a more widely 
accessible, less risky way of making demands. 
Several other proactive forms of collective action came into their own during 
the nineteenth century. The demonstration, the sponsored public meeting 
and the petition drive began to thrive with the arrival of mass electoral 
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politics. The seizure of premises by an insurrectionary committee also 
generalized during the nineteenth century, although the ties to electoral 
politics are more distant. The military pronunciamiento is of the same vintage. 
On the other hand, the general strike, the sit-in and the farmers' dumping of 
surplus crops in protest are essentially twentieth-century creations. Proactive 
forms of collective action have proliferated over the last two centuries. 
My labeling of forms has a catch to it. Strictly speaking, a public meeting or a 
general strike could fit any of the three types: competitive, reactive or 
proactive. Just as the charivari could mock a wrongdoer or celebrate a 
right-doer, people can demonstrate for something, against something, or both 
at once. The classification as competitive, reactive or proactive depends on 
the claims being asserted, not on the form of the action. The squatting and 
expropriating land occupations described by Hobsbawm have a far more 
proactive flavor than the re-occupations of lost land, although the actual 
behavior involved in the three cases is quite similar. Workers have often struck 
in defense of threatened job rights. Those strikes were reactive. Nevertheless 
there is a general association between proaction and strike activity: since the 
early nineteenth century, workers who have asserted new claims have com- 
monly done so via the strike. A substantial majority of strikes have asserted 
new claims. Parallel observations apply to demonstrations, public meetings 
and the like. Thus it is a shorthand-but  a shorthand which will do no harm 
once we understand i t - t o  speak of the food riot as a reactive form of 
collective action and the demonstration as a proactive form. 
In the Europe of the past few hundred years, the three forms of collective 
action have waxed and waned in sequence. In the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, competitive actions seem to have predominated. From the seven- 
teenth into the nineteenth century, the reactive forms became much more 
widespread, while the competitive forms remained steady or perhaps 
declined. With the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, proactive collective 
action began to predominate, the reactive forms dwindled, while new com- 
petitive forms came into existence. If I read the record right, seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europeans took collective action in defense of threatened 
rights much more than their predecessors had, while twentieth-century 
Europeans became exceptionally prone to act in support of claims they had 
not previously exercised. 
The reasons for the successive changes are, I think, twofold: 1)during the 
period from 1600 to 1850, more so than before and after, the agents of 
international markets and of national states were pressing their new (and 
proactive) claims on resources which had up to then been under the control 
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of innumerable households, communities, brotherhoods and other small-scale 
organizations. The small-scale organizations reacted repeatedly. They fought 
against taxation, conscription, the consolidation of landed property and 
numerous other threats to their organizational well-being. Eventually the big 
structures won, the battle died down, the reactive forms diminished. 2)In- 
creasingly, the stocks of resources necessary to group survival came under the 
control of large organizations, especially governments, which only redistri- 
buted them under the pressure of new claims. There may be a third factor: 
3) a general decline in the difficulty of collective action during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, as a result of the massing of population in large 
settlements and big organizations, the elaboration of communications, the 
expansion of elections as a way of doing public business. I hesitate to propose 
this third factor, because we must weigh against these facilitators of collective 
action the increased repressive activity and repressive efficiency of govern- 
ments and other large organizations. Intrinsic costs are down, but the costs 
imposed by others are up. I guess that the intrinsic costs have declined more 
than the imposed costs have risen. In the present state of our knowledge, 
however, that judgment is both risky and unverifiable. 
The scheme provides a convenient means of summing up the largest trends in 
the evolution of collective violence in western Europe over the last four or 
five centuries. Two main processes have dominated all the rest: 1) the rise of 
national states to preeminent positions in a wide variety of political activities; 
2) the increasingly associational character of the principal contenders for 
power at the local as well as at the national level. 
In 1500, no full-fledged national state with unquestioned priority over the 
other governments within its territory existed anywhere in the West. England 
was probably the closest approximation. The England of 1500 was, however, 
only fifteen years past the slaying of King Richard III by Henry Tudor at 
Bosworth Field. It was fresh from the widely-supported rebellions of Lambert 
Simnel and Perkin Warbeck. It had yet to effect the union with Scotland. It 
still harbored a number of great lords who controlled their own bands of 
armed retainers. Government itself consisted largely of shifting, competing 
coalitions among great magnates and their retinues, the king being the 
greatest magnate of the strongest coalition. Become Henry VII, Henry Tudor 
began the large work of statemaking which Henry VIII and Elizabeth so 
vigorously pursued. 
A century and a half after 1500, a great civil war reopened the question of 
whether the centralized royal apparatus the Tudors, and then the Stuarts, had 
begun building would be the dominant political organization in England. In 
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fact, the state which emerged in 1688 had rather different contours from the 
state the Tudors and Stuarts had been building. The strength and autonomy 
of Parliament far exceeded anything a cool observer of the England of 1600 
or 1620 could reasonably have anticipated. 
In 1500 most states faced serious challenges to their hegemony from both 
inside and outside the territory. Only a small minority of the hundreds or 
more or less autonomous governments survived the next two centuries of 
statemaking. Most power was concentrated in political units of smaller than 
national scale: communities, city-states, principalities, semi-autonomous 
provinces. Most contenders for power in those political units were essentially 
communal in structure: craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities. 
The predominant forms of collective violence registered those circumstances: 
wars between rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles 
among the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group 
on another. 
The rise of the state threatened the power (and often the very survival) of all 
these small-scale units. They resisted. The statemakers only won their struggle 
for predominance over the furious resistance of princes, communes, provinces 
and peasant communities. For several centuries the principal forms of col- 
lective violence therefore grew from reactive movements on the part of 
different segments of the general population: comunally-based contenders for 
power fought against loss of membership in polities, indeed against the very 
destruction of the political units in which their power was invested. Collective 
resistance to conscription, to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of 
other exactions of the state exemplify this reactive road to collective 
violence. 
For a century or more in the experience of most West European countries, 
however, the most frequent form of violence-producing reactive movement 
aimed at the market more directly than at the state. That was the food riot. 
The name is misleading: most often the struggle turned about raw grain rather 
than edibles, and most of the time it did not reach the point of physical 
violence. The classic European food riot had three main variants: the re- 
tributive action, in which a crowd attacked the persons, property or premises 
of someone believed to be hoarding or profiteering; the blockage, in which a 
group of local people prevented the shipment of food out of their own 
locality, requiring it to be stored or sold locally; the price riot, in which 
people seized stored food or food displayed for sale, sold it publicly at a price 
they declared to be proper, and handed the money over to the owner or 
merchant. 
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In the best-documented cases-England and France of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries-the blockage occurred more frequently than the price 
riot, and much more often than the retributive action. In those two countries, 
the food riot practically disappeared some time during the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Later, questions of food supply motivated dramatic collective actions 
now and then, but almost always in the form of demonstrations in which 
producers complained about low prices or consumers complained about high 
prices. 
The timing of the food riot's rise and fall is revealing. In England, France and 
some other parts of western Europe, the food riot displaced the tax rebellion 
as the most frequent violent form of collective action toward the end of the 
senventeenth century. It declined precipitously in England just after 1820, in 
Germany and France just after 1850, only to linger on in parts of Spain and 
Italy into the twentieth century. The calendar did not conform to the history 
of hunger; indeed the great killing famines of Medieval and Renaissance 
Europe were disappearing as the food riot came into its own, and per capita 
food supply was probably increasing through much of the period. Instead, 
three conjoint changes account for the timing: 1)the proletarianization of 
the population, which meant a drastic diminution in the proportion of 
households which produced enough food for the subsistence of their own 
members, a great expansion in the number dependent on the market for 
survival; 2)the commercialization of food production, which included the 
building of national markets and the promotion of the ideas that the national 
market should have priority over local needs and that the market's operation 
tended to set a just, proper and efficient price; 3)the dismantling of the 
extensive previously-existing controls over the distribution of food, which 
gave the local population a prior claim over food produced and sold in a 
locality, and bound the local authorities to provide for the subsistence of the 
local poor. 
E.P. Thompson has called the entire process a decline of the old Moral 
Economy, a shift from a bread nexus to a cash nexus. People resisted the 
process so long as local solidarity and some collective memory of the 
locality's prior claims survived. To an important degree, the crowd's actions 
of blocking, inventorying, storing, declaring a price and holding a public sale 
for the benefit of the locals fulfilled what had previously been the obligations 
of the local authorities in dealing with shortages and high prices. Magistrates 
or mayors often acknowledged that fact implicitly by acquiescing in the 
routine. When local officials took the initiative themselves, the crowd usually 
stopped its work. 
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The immediate objects of the crowd's attention were commonly local of- 
ficials, bakers, rich farmers and, especially, grain merchants. The struggle 
pitted the claims of the national market against the claims of the local 
population. For that reason, the geography of the food riot reflected the 
geography of the grain market: tending to form a ring around London, Paris, 
another capital or a major port, concentrating especially along rivers, canals 
and principal roads. For the acute English crises of 1795-96 and 1800-01, 
Stevenson remarks: 
The map shows the extremely close relationship of disturbances to the 
communications network in the production areas around London in these 
two shortages. The most striking pattern overall is that of 1795-96 when at 
least fifty food disturbances took place at communication centres, either 
coastal ports, canal or river ports, or towns within easy carting distance of 
major populations centres. 6 
Yet the reflection of the market came through a distorting mirror, for the 
most thoroughly commercialized areas, adjacent to large old cities, did not 
typically produce food riots. There, the market had already won out over 
local rights to the food supply. 
Despite the salience of the market, the food riot also resulted in part from the 
rise of the national state. In general (although with great hesitations, varia- 
tions and differences in outcome) European statemakers acted to promote all 
three of the processes underlying the food riot: proletarianization, commer- 
cialization, dismantling of local controls. As their dependent government 
staffs, urban populations and non-agricultural labor forces swelled, the 
managers of states intervened increasingly to promote marketing. (There is 
irony in the fact that they acted thus in the name of freeing the market.) As 
Stevenson says of the English crisis of 1795: 
The government, however, was determined to keep out of the internal 
corn trade and attempted to keep up the normal circulation of grain, so 
that the large urban centres would be supplied. On these grounds the 
government refused to yield to the pleas of local authorities and interfere 
with the normal movement of g ra in . . .  It was reported to the Home 
Office that stopping the movement of grain had become so widespread 
that country millers were said to be frightened to send grain to the capital 
except by night. In an attempt to free the circulation of grain from these 
checks the government passed an act to prevent the stopping of grain by 
making the whole hundred liable to fine and individuals liable to fine and 
imprisonment 7 . 
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In that crisis, many local officials sought to restrict the flow of grain away 
from their own markets. Within three decades, however, the market and the 
national government had won their battle; few mayors and magistrates chose 
to counter the national will, and few hungry crowds harbored the hope of 
making them do so. One of the great English forms of collective action had 
withered away. 
Two things eventually put an end to the predominance of the reactive forms, 
although at times and at tempos which varied markedly from one part of the 
West to another. First, the state won almost everywhere. One may ask how 
complete the victory of the state was in the remote sections of vast territories 
such as Canada, Australia or Brazil, and speculate whether recent surges of 
sectionalism in Belgium, Great Britain and even France presage the end of 
state control. Yet on the whole the two centuries after 1700 produced an 
enormous concentration of resources and means of coercion under the 
control of national states, to the virtual exclusion of other levels of govern- 
ment. Second, a whole series of organizational changes closely linked to 
urbanization, industrialization and the expansion of capitalism greatly re- 
duced the role of the communal group as a setting for mobilization and as a 
repository for power; the association of one kind or another came to be the 
characteristic vehicle for collective action. The rise of the joint-stock com- 
pany, the political party, the labor union, the club all belong to the same 
general trend. 
Working together, the victory of the state and the rise of the association 
transformed the collective actions which most commonly produced violence. 
In country after country, politics nationalized; the crucial struggles for 
power went on at a national scale. The participants in those struggles were 
most often organized as associations. The strike, the demonstration, the party 
conspiracy, the organized march on the capital, the parliamentary session, the 
mass meeting became the usual settings for collective violence. The state 
became an interested participant in all collective violence-as policeman, as 
party to the conflict, as tertius gaudens. Although at first glance such exotic 
events as charivaris and food riots seem far removed from questions of power 
and politics, their rise and fall depends intimately on changes in the structure 
of political power. 
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